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Background: Guinea-Bissau is one of the world’s poorest and least developed countries. Amid poverty, political
turmoil and state withdrawal, its health workforce (HW) has been swamped for the last four decades in a deepening
crisis of under-resourcing, poor performance and laissez-faire.
Methods: The present study aimed at analysing the human resources for health (HRH) situation in Guinea-Bissau in
light of the recent literature on distressed health systems, with the objective of contributing to understanding the ways
health workers react to protracted turmoil, the resulting distortions and the counter-measures that might be considered.
Through document analysis, focus group discussions, 14 semi-structured and 5 in-depth interviews, we explored patterns
as they became visible on the ground.
Results: Since independence, Guinea-Bissau experienced political events that have reflected on the healthcare arena and
on the evolution of its health workforce, such as different coup attempts, waves of diaspora and shifting external
assistance. The chronic scarcity of funds and a ‘stable political instability’ have lead to the commercialisation of
public health services and to flawed mechanisms for training and deploying health personnel. In absence of any
form of governance, health workers have come to own and run the health system. We show that the HRH crisis
in Guinea-Bissau can only be understood by looking at its historical evolution and at the wider socio-economic
context. There are no quick fixes for the deterioration of HRH in undergoverned states; however, the recognition
of the ingrained distortions and an understanding of the forces determining the behaviour of key actors are
essential premises for the identification of solutions.
Conclusions: Guinea-Bissau’s case study suggests that any policy that does not factor in the limited clout of
health authorities over a effectively privatised healthcare arena is doomed from the start. Improving health
system governance and quality of training should take precedence over expanding HRH. A bloated and ineffective
workforce must be managed through incentives rather than administrative orders, in order to improve skills and
productivity against higher remuneration and better working conditions. Donor support might be crucial to trigger
positive changes, through realistic and sustained investments.
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Human resources for health (HRH) has long been
recognised as a critical component of any health system
[1], due to their large financial implications [2] and the
way they shape its functioning. In situations of conflict
and prolonged governance disarray, health systems get
critically distorted, with consequences lasting well into the
years after the end of turbulence [3]. The health workforce
gets particularly affected by violence, as its numbers in the
field decrease, professionals are victims of attacks and
migrate, their skills decline, while accelerated and un-
planned training may expand the supply of underqualified
health personnel [4].
Attempts have been made in the past to conceptualise
post-war health recovery and human resources for
health [5], with the objective of identifying the support
needed to overcome the flaws induced by protracted
stress [6]. A review of the HR field [7] concluded that
while aspects such as supply, education and recruitment
have been investigated in post-conflict situations, others
such as deployment and governance have not been ad-
equately covered. Some have explored political economy
aspects of human resources for health and of related
policies [8–10], as well as the role of human resources
for health in the state-building process following an armed
conflict [11]. The complex remuneration of health workers,
generated by multiple activities in undergoverned contexts,
have also attracted the interest of scholars [12, 13].
Where the state is absent, underfinanced or plainly
failed, the applicability of widely held concepts is called
into question. The conventional view of a national health
system covering a clearly demarcated territory managed
by recognised health authorities does not apply to many
healthcare spaces multiplying in the global South [3, 14].
Thus, standard health policy and planning tools fall
short of capturing the complexities of distressed systems,
not least because of the paucity of reliable health and
systems data in such circumstances [4].
Guinea-Bissau offers itself to scrutiny as one of the
poorest and most dysfunctional states in the world.
Unlike other equally derelict countries, possibly due to
its small size, marginal strategic value and lack of natural
resources, Guinea-Bissau and its health system have
received little attention from the press, the international
community and academia [15]. The present study aimed
at analysing the HRH situation in Guinea-Bissau in light
of the recent literature on health systems in fragile states,
with the objective of identifying the key forces shaping the
development of its health workforce, the resulting distor-
tions and the counter-measures to be considered.
Background
Swamped in political instability, underdevelopment and
stalled economic growth since its independence [16],Guinea-Bissau exemplifies the state that, far from having
‘failed’, has never really functioned as expected [17]. Dur-
ing the last 40 years, the country has experienced social-
ist rule, civil war and prolonged political and military
unrest, until becoming a hub for international drug
smuggling routes [18]. The latest military coup in con-
nection with the 2012 presidential elections came to
shake once again the precarious balance of power; after
the 2014 elections, a recognised government is currently
in place [19]. In 2014, the country was ranked 176th out
of 187 in the UN Human Development Index [20, 21]
with the poverty headcount ratio at 69.3% in 2010—up
from 64.7% in 2002.
Guinea-Bissau has a small economy, with a gross
domestic product (GDP) of just above 1 billion USD
(550 USD-PPP per capita). Economic growth averaged
2.5% in the last 5 years, although following the resumption
of donor financing after the latest coup d’état and thanks
to sustained international prices for cashew nut—the
country’s key export—the economy expanded by 5.1%
in 2015 [22]. Net Overseas Development Assistance
accounted for 10.6% of the gross national income and
financed 46% of public spending. Dominated by non-
tax sources, such as customs duties and fishing licenses,
internal revenues represented 14% of the country’s
wealth. In 2015, the wage bill accounted for 51% of the
government budget [23].
Total health spending is estimated at 5.6% of GDP, with
just 21% supported by public funds, and out-of-pocket ex-
penditures representing 62% of private contributions [20].
The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) was allocated 8%
of government budget in 2015, with salaries taking up
72% of public health expenditures [23]. It is a shared opin-
ion that Guinea-Bissau’s future fiscal position does not
bode well for its poverty reduction plans.
Life expectancy in Guinea-Bissau is estimated to be 55.8
for women and 52.8 for men, with under 15-year-olds
representing 42% of its population [21]. The country’s epi-
demiological profile is dominated by poverty-related com-
municable diseases, such as respiratory infections, malaria,
AIDS (prevalence of 3.9%) and tuberculosis [24]. Successive
multiple indicators surveys have shown a substantial reduc-
tion in infant mortality in the last decade, estimated in
2014 to be around 55/1000; 32% of under five children
were found to be underweight. Some recent UN estimates
put maternal mortality at 900/100 000 [24]. The country’s
health system structure has changed little in the last
40 years, with a wide base of basic health units sup-
ported by community health workers and traditional
birth attendants, health centres staffed by civil servants,
primary health services organised around outreach pro-
grammes, five regional hospitals with some surgery capacity
and one central hospital located in the capital city—the
Simão Mendes Central Hospital [25, 26]. Overall health
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pre-war level of 40% [27].
Despite recent attempts to revitalise its health system,
health indicators are sagging, while its already shaky
health workforce is deteriorating further [28]. In 2015
almost 27 956 assisted deliveries and 171 135 ante-natal
care visits were recorded for a population of 1.5 million
(Table 1 below). Just 2221 Caesarean sections were per-
formed, 66% of which in the capital city area; during
the same year, just 1.4 new admissions were recorded
per surgical bed, 5.1 for obstetric and 2.6 for general
medicine ones.
The methodology used
We started from the assumption that, because of its key
exogenous and endogenous shaping factors, a health
workforce acquires specific features—the distortions—-
which are essentially similar to what is observable in
other distressed contexts, even if the mix and intensity
of each are distinctive of the country under analysis
(Fig. 1). Crucially, the boundaries between formal and
informal workers active in such health workforce are
often blurred, and it is hard to acquire a firm idea of its
true size [29].
Through document analysis, focus group, semi-structured
and in-depth interviews, we aimed at assessing the presence
and combination in the Guinea-Bissau case study of the
aspects observed in other troubled settings, such as (a) the
empty void vs. crowded space characterisation [14], (b) the
commercialisation of health services [30], (c) the influenceTable 1 Public health system selected in-patient and outpatient act










Bafatá 214 541 3257 228 267 25 217
Bijagos 23 728 452 0 11 3315
Biombo 99 364 2257 37 209 13 708
Bolama 10 900 169 0 4 942
Cacheu 197 634 3121 138 386 24 116
Farim 51 545 847 4 139 7329
Gabú 219 586 3681 135 249 28 212
Oio 178 348 2350 147 392 19 400
Quinara 64 909 896 0 75 6554
Greater Bissau
(SAB)
389 918 9345 1467 451 29 707
Tombali 97 282 1581 65 114 12 635
Total 1 547 754 27 956 2221 2297 171 135
Source: INASA (2016): Boletins mensais de 2015
aNumber of beds available are not cumulative, as these are used and separately coof different forms of multiple employment [31], (d) resource
flows into the system [10], (e) inconsistent engagements of
foreign organisations in the health arena [32], (f ) poor
quality of training, (g) diverse qualifications of health
personnel [33], (h) over-recruitment for political purposes,
(i) imbalanced distribution of personnel, (l) failed past
attempts to reform the sector [9], (m) inflated payrolls and
(n) the influence of the diaspora on the labour market.
Data collection and data analysis
Published and unpublished documents in Portuguese
and English from the 1970s and 1980s were first reviewed
on (a) the historical and political crisis in Guinea-Bissau,
(b) the Guinea-Bissau health system and its evolution, (c)
health policy documents and (c) health systems under
stress. PubMed, Scopus, Googlescholar and EconLit data-
bases were searched for terms such as ‘Human Resources
for Health AND Crisis’, ‘Guinea Bissau AND Health’,
‘Conflict AND Human Resources’, ‘Portuguese-speaking
African countries AND Human Resources for Health’,
‘Diaspora AND Human Resources for Health’, ‘Health
systems AND Post-war Reconstruction’. The World
Bank and WHO health databases and UNICEF MICS
across several years were used as data sources.
Data on the characteristics and deployment of the
current health workforce of Guinea-Bissau and on training
outputs were obtained from the MoPH’s National
Directorate for Human Resources (DNRH) and from
the National School of Health (ENS). An original Excel



















103 156 2194 286 3941 1034
1009 96 124 54 669 393
225 1 1792 99 2164 401
0 26 108 291 487
203 394 1024 569 2286 1055
13 781 80 604 253
168 188 2322 277 906 135
11 157 288 213 1206 862
45 61 712 345 2253 777
1338 1130 9535 1582 10 177 3493
67 85 1190 296 1614 1059
3182 2268 19 988 3909 26 111 9949
unted for different specialties
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework to understand the evolution of Guinea-Bissau's health workforce through shaping factors and ensuing distortions
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each individual health worker currently employed in
the health sector.
An inception focus group [34] was conducted with five
health officials purposively selected by and among the
country’s current ENS training institution in Bissau to
brainstorm ideas on the evolution of the health work-
force since independence, on the key distortions and
shaping factors, and on potential informants for the in-
terviews. Fourteen semi-structured [35] and 5 work and
career history in-depth interviews [36, 37] were con-
ducted in Lisbon, Bissau and Bolama districts by two
researchers. Key informants were selected among policy-
makers, government officials, health workers and inter-
national health organisations personnel and identified
through a snowball technique. Interviews were stopped
when saturation point was reached for the key themes.
The semi-structured interviews touched on (1) the
interviewee’s appraisal of the current HRH situation in
Guinea-Bissau, (2) his/her opinion/knowledge on its
evolution, (3) identification of key turning points that
modified the HRH along the last decades, (4) personal
perceptions of key problems and (5) probing the key dis-
tortions identified from the literature (see the Interview
Guide in Appendix 1). Work history interviews explored
health workers’ experience of entering the health system,
his/her recruitment, training, deployment, current and
past work routines and sources of revenues (see Work
History Guide in Appendix 2).
Interviews were conducted in Portuguese between
February and March 2016. Semi-structured interview
lasted for between 45 and 90 min. In-depth life story
interviews lasted for over 2 h. They were all audio-
recorded and analysed for contents, according to the
shaping factors and distortion categories identified inthe literature; then, they were traced and triangulated
across interview groups; finally, a narrative of events was
constructed for the evolution of the crisis, stakeholder
influences, dominant distortions and their combination.
Individual informants were asked to confirm specific
narratives during the paper’s writing-up to ensure
internal validity.Results
Evolution of the health workforce
As with other African countries, in colonial Guinea-Bissau,
health services were essentially curative and hospital-based,
designed around the needs of the white population residing
in or visiting the country [38]. Physicians and other senior
cadres were either from Portugal and Cape Verde, while
lower-level health workers were trained locally in the main
healthcare institutions. With independence from Portugal
in 1974, the totality of foreign physicians and a considerable
proportion of older Guinean nurses fled the country,
attracted by the prospect of claiming retirement benefits
from the new Portuguese State, in what was identified by
the interviewees as the first wave of health workers’
diaspora (Fig. 2).
Re-training and integration of war health auxiliaries—-
known as socorristas—started in 1976 in the Nhala and
successively in the Bolama training schools. Because of
the connections created during the liberation struggle,
the then-USSR and Cuba offered to Guinea-Bissau medical
training scholarships, with the objective of filling the void
left in the health system by the decolonisation process. The
1980 coup overthrowing first president Luís Cabral was
seen as a sea change for Guinea-Bissau towards a market-
oriented economic model; for many interviewees, this shift
impacted on the motivation of health workers to serve in
Fig. 2 Timelines of historical events and their repercussions on Guinea-Bissau’s health workforce
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services’ section).
Community health workers (CHWs) were trained in
the 1980s by European non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) [39], and their utilisation was consolidated in
connection to the launch of the Bamako Initiative in the
country, a revolving drug fund scheme aimed at financing
healthcare provision [40]. The National Health School
(ENS) was established between 1992 and 1995 in Bissau,
with the objective of training and upgrading nurses and
health technicians, while the local university started train-
ing physicians with Cuban support. In this short period,
the World Bank and UN agencies funded HWs’ training
(Fig. 2).
A first attempt to define a HRH plan was carried out
in 1996, with the aim of consolidating the gains of a
primary care-oriented strategy previously imple-
mented [41]. However, the 1998–1999 civil war buried
the feeble progress made in health workforce develop-
ment in the previous 25 years. Amid security con-
cerns, those who could fled the country, in what was
identified by our interviewees as the 2nd HRH dias-
pora wave. Recently trained senior cadres left, aided
by a relaxation of hosting requirements set by the
international community for refugees.
[…] in the first diaspora it was mostly elder nurses
who left, but now it was physicians, managers and
senior government officials…. We were left with
nobody to run the [health] system. Policy-maker-003.
The practice of referring patients for care abroad—with a
health worker accompanying his/her ailing patient—-
became common, representing a corridor for physicians
desperate to leave their beleaguered country. Training
abroad, however, did not stop during the war years, and
many of the senior doctors these days in key government
positions received their education in that period, mostly in
European universities.After successive coups and election rounds, João Bernardo
(Nino) Vieira established himself as the country’s strongman
in 2004; this event brought back funds and international
support for the health sector. The Cuban Brigade returned
to train physicians in Bissau in 2005, with the World Bank
funding the restructuring of ENS, its mid-level training
courses, and the development of the second National Plan
for Human Resources Development (PNDRH II) through
2008 [42]. When Nino Vieira was assassinated, the country
was hurled back into political turmoil, with the international
community focussing more on peace building than on
health service provision [19].
The first locally trained physicians started graduating
and entering the health system in 2013, and the ENS
began to run nursing and technical courses funded
exclusively through student fees. The economy started
to grow again, in particular in the capital city Bissau
Autonomous Area, today home to a third of the country’s
population [20].
Key forces shaping the development of the Health
Workforce in Guinea-Bissau
Scarcity of funds and political instability emerged as the
two key forces shaping human resources for health in
Guinea-Bissau between independence and modern days.
In absolute terms, markedly little money is currently
allocated to health salaries by the state budget; the total
wage bill for the 2173 employees in the health sector in
2015 was XOF216 million per month (US$393 392).
Remarkably, the State only pays for healthcare-related
salaries, with all other expenses (medicines, goods and
services, investments) being partially covered by external
funds and by health facilities’ own revenues. Incomplete
data on external assistance combine with absent informa-
tion on the user fees paid to obscure true financing levels.
Together with education workers, public jobs in the
health sector are widely considered privileged in compari-
son to other civil servants, having been protected against
cuts. Health employees’ average salary was US$169 per
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physicians US$291 and specialists US$380 [43]. Salaries
are typically paid with considerable delays—although
with arrears—and it is considered the norm for new
recruits to receive their first payments only 1 year after
starting the post. Failure to pay regular salaries to
health workers was mentioned as one of the causes of
recent strikes. After the latest contested election results,
the World Bank agreed in 2014 to provide earmarked
funds for health personnel expenditures from its Social
Protection programme, in a move intended to avoid
health workers walk-outs, decrease the rising tension and
minimise the risk of civil unrest. The state’s inability to
provide for its employees was seen by many as one of the
key weaknesses of the system.
If you cannot even pay for salaries, you’re not a State;
you are just an added coach to the World Bank’s
train! Government official-001
Health and education payrolls were cleaned and con-
solidated between 2014 and 2015, and a new personal
bank account-based payment system introduced to
eliminate ghost workers in these sectors, the two largest
public employers. However, the World Bank’s support to
personnel expenditures was terminated for alleged manage-
ment irregularities and for the government’s failure to avoid
health workers’ walk-outs in December 2015.
The term ‘political instability’ (PI) was called upon by all
our interviewees as the major determinant of the country’s
current situation, with pervasive ramifications for the
health workforce. Since independence, the country has
experienced 18 coup attempts, and recently, three health
ministers were changed in as many years [28]. HRH devel-
opment is forcibly undermined by such constraint.
Additionally, domestic turmoil provokes donor reactions,
in turn affecting the resources allocated to healthcare
provision. On the other hand, the ritual invocation of
PI offers a convenient screen behind which health
workers adopt questionable behaviours, and managers
abstain from sanctioning them.
The term ‘political instability’ was used loosely by our
informants, at times employed to refer to the phenomenon
of governance failure, and other times to describe its conse-
quences. At least five different interpretations of this con-
cept were identified, namely:
a. Political instability as the recurring turnover of
politicians, policy-makers and mid-level managers,
which would prevent policies being upheld, and
plans implemented. Therefore, such officials could
not be held responsible for carrying out demanding
tasks and for taking initiatives. The awareness of the
limited time they are likely to spend in office breedsshort-termism among government officials, who
therefore dedicate their efforts to seize low-hanging
fruits in the best of case, or to get access to public
resources in the worst.
b. PI as disruption of financing flows, as after each
coup attempt or civil unrest public sector salaries
and foreign-sponsored health programmes get
interrupted—this was described by one informant
as ‘turning off the tap when the situation cyclically
deteriorates’.
c. PI as an inherent vulnerability of all public
institutions, exposed by the slightest of adverse
events, coupled by an incapacity to put up a
response at any level—a sort of systemic
vulnerability (‘[…..] our country’s like a patient
without his immune system: any issue turns into a
disease’. Health worker-005.
d. PI as lack of economic development stemming
from the country’s weakness. At times used as
an excuse for anything wrong in Guinea-Bissau,
some of our informants explained that ‘….
patients don’t have the money to pay for [user]
fees because of the political instability’. Health
worker-002. Poverty, and the state frailty induced
by meagre tax yealds, is therefore conflated with
turbulence, a manifestation of, as well as an ag-
gravating factor for state withdrawal.
e. PI as inability of the government to exert power by
controlling, monitoring and evaluating the application
of the rule of law and frequently being itself an
egregious violator of it.
International aid in the health field has changed con-
siderably in direction and intensity over the years, first
inspired by geopolitical motives in the years following
independence, and more recently motivated to a large
extent by global security and drug smuggling control
concerns [19]. The development of the national health
workforce has been swayed by the Portuguese former
colonial power offering refuge to professionals during
the two diaspora waves, as well as by the ideologies and
technical expertise of those former communist bloc
countries—particularly Cuba—offering opportunities for
training abroad first, and then creating capacity for
training physicians locally. Far from remaining a do-
mestic process, HRH development has been affected
by multiple international forces. This crucial aspect,
regularly missed by traditional policy and planning
approaches, is becoming the norm in an increasingly
globalised world, particularly in small countries with
open borders [44].
Lower-level training has been intermittently supported
by UN agencies and the World Bank, as well as by a
short-lived attempt in the 1980s by the Dutch cooperation
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comparatively limited interest and involvement of bilateral
international agencies with successive governments,
non-government organisations have traditionally played
a substantial role in health service delivery in Guinea-
Bissau. Faith-based organisations—particularly those
linked to the Catholic Church—were among the few to
remain in the country during the war years; they are
still considered one of the few providers of quality ser-
vices in the country, particularly those in the capital
city area.
More recently, the international aid community has
withdrawn from funding HRH training; it is however strik-
ing how donors have adopted diverse positions in the
Guinea-Bissau’s health arena, ranging from the European
Commission’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from
engaging public health institutions, to the World Bank
earmarking of salary funds for the social sectors. NGOs—-
particularly Portugal-based ones—have since thrived,
ready to occupy the space and funding previously
channelled to activities carried out by the national gov-
ernment; the large EU-funded Integrated Mother and
Child Health Programme is largely managed though
NGOs contracts.
For Guinea-Bissau, aid dependency translates into accept-
ing donor agendas, with their proliferating priorities, chan-
ging fashions and de-contextualised decision-making. Some
of these agendas have heavily shaped domestic develop-
ments and not always in the way expected by aid agencies.
The Bamako Initiative is illustrative of such pattern; its im-
pact on the health workforce, and in turn on access to
health care and on its quality, cannot be ignored.
Commercialisation of public services
Together, the forces described in the previous section
have commoditised healthcare provision, as witnessed in
healthcare arenas as diverse as Cambodia [45], Lebanon
[46] and Somalia [47]. It is an open secret in Guinea-
Bissau that fees are charged for any kind of health care.
Statutory fees—and respective exemptions—are defined
for specific services and drugs, with the stated objective
of recovering drug costs and providing health facilities
with a management fund; but in practice, such fees have
been hijacked by health professionals, with charges re-
ported to be erratic, arbitrary and at times unreasonable.
While this ubiquity of illegal charges was recognised for
the comparatively prosperous capital city area [31], our
interviews revealed the practice to be thriving also in the
poorest rural areas.
[…] No sir, this is the way it works here [in Bolama]:
treatment for uncomplicated malaria is worth XOF7,000
[$12.72], complicated malaria cases [involving
intravenous drips and second line treatment] twiceas much, and a Caesarean section in Simão Mendes
Central Hospital is XOF37,000 ($63.3). Health
worker-001.
As no financial system seems to be in place to truly re-
cover the costs of the resources used by the facilities—apart
for the Bamako Initiative-inspired drug revolving funds
through which health care units purchase their drugs at
subsidised prices from the central drug store—revenues
from charges are entirely captured and managed by health
workers acting as managers (‘No money goes back to
Bissau, just the [health statistics] data’. Health worker-002).
Unaffordable charges were identified as the true reason
behind low service utilisation in the poorest rural regions.
While the existence of a flourishing folk medicine—-
divided between medical plants healers (djambakôs), Islamic
faith therapists (mouros) and shamans (curandeiros)—is doc-
umented for Guinea-Bissau [48], little evidence was found
of informal health practitioners for the poorest rural areas.
For the comparatively richer and more dynamic Bissau area,
informal drug stores (boutiques) were reported as often
recruiting health workers from the public service to offer a
sort of ‘medicines cum informal consultation’ service.
This system of informal charges was touted to be so
institutionalised among health professionals and users
alike, to be taken for granted as the official way of supple-
menting meagre and irregular salaries in poor regions and
to make a decent living in the more expensive capital city.
The health workers interviewed declared seeing the issue of
charges as intimately related to their low and erratic remu-
neration. Many declared feeling ‘abandoned’ by the State,
which barely pays for salaries, but leaves health profes-
sionals fending for themselves for recurrent expenses. As a
result, many stated having to turn into managers to use
these unofficial resources to run public services, purchasing
drugs, hiring local support staff and paying for transport
and maintenance. Predictably, informants did not mention
the portion of fees they pocket.
….with that money you have to first pay for drugs.
Then you pay for petrol and small maintenance
repairs. Then you pay for the ‘locally contracted’ staff.
But as this month the money is tight, I have already
told them they will have to wait for next month to be
paid. Health worker-003.
As no effective inspection system is in place, the nature
and extent of charges and mark-ups were reported to
depend exclusively on the goodwill (and creativity) of the
most senior officials in charge, on their ability to enforce
those charges, and on the market to take the price.
I am not against the health service charges, but to me
the real shame are the ‘fines’ some health workers charge
Table 2 Evolution of the health workforce between 1996 and
2016, by categories
Category 1996 2007 2016
Physicians 165 104 264
Nurses 357 300 1027
Midwives 67 177 141
Technical staff 276 199 244
Support 417 642 98
Other (aux.) 1043 696 399
Total 2325 2118 2173
Sources: PNDS I (1997), PNDS II (2008), DNRH (2016)
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or do not bring their kids to get a jab. NGI-001.
Although complaining about meagre public earnings,
as well as the distance from the capital city, health workers
seemed to have adjusted to the current living conditions,
allocating time to other daily chores and alternative profit-
generating activities.
…I wake up very early every day. Before going to work
I have to procure ‘mafé’ [a meal’s protein ingredient
accompanying the staple rice dish] for my family’s
dinner. Then I go to work. Now that it’s the cashew
nut harvest time I have to leave early to check on the
workers tending my trees. HW-002.
Commercialisation pervades the healthcare arena beyond
the fees charged for the services provided. Professional
training has been turned into a business, offering another
manifestation of the same process, as described in the next
section.
Distortions in HRH training and deployment
The public health sector currently officially employs
2173 workers in Guinea-Bissau, of which 264 physicians
and 1027 nurses. In relation to the served population,
there were 1.7 physicians and 11.5 health workers per
10 000 inhabitants in 2016. Over the recent years, the
impact of the war-related diaspora on the workforce has
been noticeable, particularly in terms of the loss of
skilled cadres between 1996 and 2007 (Table 2).
Although on balance, the health workforce has been
relatively stable during the last two decades, progress
has been registered in terms of the upgrade of auxiliary
health personnel, and of the reduction of support staff in
favour of training general nurses and physicians [41, 49].
While the overall number of physicians has grown by
37.5% in 20 years—enough to offset the significant
decrease registered in the post-war years—the nursesemployed in the public system experienced an almost
threefold increase in the last decade.
Interestingly, despite the lack of resources and low ser-
vice utilisation, additional support staff is often recruited
locally, including non-health personnel, retired technical
staff or recently qualified health workers waiting to be
appointed. These health workers tend to escape reporting,
both in relation to their presence and remuneration.
…yes, I worked here as a lab technician for over
40 years. When I retired, I offered to continue
supporting the health centre with my expertise. But
with the new [bank-based] payment system I stopped
receiving my salary, and I receive payments irregularly,
depending on the tasks I carry out. HW-004
In 2016, 60% of all health workers were female, although
women represented only 31% of physicians. The nurse to
physician ratio was 3.89 for the whole country, quite a
balanced, although unplanned one. The ratio of combined
nurse, auxiliary nurse and midwife to physician was 4.84,
with substantial differences between the ratios in the capital
city (3.05) and remote rural areas such as Quínara e Bijagós
(16.00 and 14.67, respectively).
Although staff distribution is heavily influence by
distribution of hospital beds, substantial geographical
imbalances emerge, as 51% of all physicians, and 40%
of all nurses are still based in the Bissau Autonomous
area, home to just 25% of the country’s population.
Populous regions such as Bafatá and Gabú show a system-
atic disadvantage in the deployment of all types of health
personnel in favour of the Bissau and neighbouring Biombo
areas (Table 3).
Arbitrary deployment was widely reported to be a key
issue; although attempts have been made to establish a
Deployment and Transfer Commission defining rules and
standards to allocate new personnel to health regions ac-
cording to needs, distributing health workers remains a
largely opaque process, subject to political pressures and
trading practices.
…we are trying to set standards, rules and procedures,
but so far the commission has not met regularly, and
if we receive a request from high-up to transfer
somebody to Bissau, we have no way of saying no.
Health official-002.
Staff deployment driven by the motivations of health
workers rather than health service needs is a widespread
phenomenon [50], only more visible in an undergoverned
healthcare arena. Compounding the frailty of management
structures, the inadequate enticements offered to staff re-
luctant to accept hardship posts cannot redress the strong
forces at play. Moreover, health authorities short on
Table 3 The officially recorded Health Workforce in Guinea Bissau, by category and regional deployment (2016)
Category S.A.B. Bissau Other provinces Total
No. As % of total (%) No. As % of total (%) No. As % of grand total
Population 389 918 25 1 157 836 75 1 547 754 100
Specialised physicians 15 54 13 46 28 1
General practice physician 119 50 117 50 236 11
Other higher education personnel 128 80 33 20 161 7
Nurses 409 40 618 60 1027 47
Midwives 75 53 66 47 141 6
Technical staff 147 60 97 40 244 11
Auxiliary 39 74 14 26 53 2
Auxiliary nurses 50 45 61 55 111 5
Administrative personnel 58 78 16 22 74 3
Support staff 59 60 39 40 98 5
Grand Total 1099 51 1074 49 2173 100
Source: DNRH (2016). Locally-recruited cadres not included in this count
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actual service needs.
Health personnel training increased dramatically be-
tween 2009 and 2015, with the reformed ENS graduating
1125 health cadres [51], against the few hundreds pro-
jected by the PNDRH, and the local Faculty of Medicine
graduating in excess of 100 general physicians with the
support of the Cuban Brigade. The training of nurses in
particular has expanded, despite failing to receive any
external or state fund—with 829 new nurses over 7 years.
Since 2009, recurrent expenditures for such courses have
been supported exclusively by student fees, in the Bissau
main training school as well as in its southern outposts
(polos de formação), these latter now discontinued. Des-
pite the relatively high fees (approximately US$500 over
the 2-year course), such courses were reported to be
routinely oversubscribed.
For every nursing course we have 100 openings, but
at times we receive over 2000 applications! […] - but
the quality of such applicants is not good – sometimes
we have to lower the minimum grade accepted, and go
down to 9 grades [out of 20]. Policy-maker-005.
Physicians are both trained abroad and locally, through
the Cuba-supported local Faculty of Medicine; more
recently, two private medical schools started operating
in Bissau, although programmes and facilities are still to
receive accreditation from the MoPH, and one of the
schools was shut down for irregularities in 2016.
The majority of the interviewees identified quality of
training as a pressing concern. Although training curricula
were reformed and updated, factors like (a) applicants’
education level, (b) poor competence of teachers, (c) highteachers to students ratios and (d) sub-optimal practice
sites, were cited as key constrains.
The new nurses we get here sometimes can’t read and
count properly, not to mention mastering the basics
of clinical care. The old ones that should teach them
have already gained too many bad habits, and are
plainly not interested in passing on their expertise.
NGI-001.
Local church and NGO representatives working with
clinical personnel claimed to have needed to retrain the
health workers assigned by the MoPH before employing
them in their own facilities, for lack of the required skills.
No Ministry of Health (MoH) in-service training
programme exists for updating and developing the
skills of the national personnel, with the initiative left
to NGOs and international agencies, launching specific
training programmes as they see fit. At the MoH level,
supervision is the responsibility of the underfunded Central
Inspectorate Unit, consisting of one senior official and two
support staff. Regional Health Directorates are also charged
with conducting inspection visits to their health facil-
ities, but no specific budget lines are made available for
this purpose.
Discussion
This study of Guinea-Bissau’s health workforce not only
confirmed many of the attributes found elsewhere in
undergoverned countries but also presented original
features worth highlighting. Privatisation from within,
commoditisation of health care, privately-sustained pro-
duction of health workers, are some of the recognisable
characteristics Guinea-Bissau shares with other countries
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[29]. Such developments occurred against an official back-
drop of public health provision, with health professionals
eager to enter the civil service, and health authorities keen
to offer jobs and other related perks. However, the
persistent scarcity of domestic funding and fluctuating
external assistance have exposed such patterns in clear
contours in Guinea-Bissau, setting it aside from other
countries such as Angola, where oil revenues have
allowed an unchecked expansion of the civil service,
and Mozambique, whose health sector has been pro-
pelled by generous aid flows [33].
Political instability appears to be a key shaping force
of Guinea-Bissau’s domestic environment, whether this
term is used to describe the government’s inability to
exert power, its fragility or the continuous disruption of
resource flows. Rather than the exception, political in-
stability has come to represent the norm for Guinea-
Bissau: future attempts to revitalise the health sector
will have to factor in this permanent turmoil, as the
country has not really known any other form of operating
since independence.
An extreme case of ungoverned health workforce is
possibly what we witnessed in Guinea-Bissau. Left to
their own devices, abandoned by their official employer,
with little or no supervision, health workers have grad-
ually become the real owners and operators of health
services, run to their advantage and regardless of their
worth to the users. Arguably, the Bamako Initiative has
been appropriated as a convenient fig leaf behind which
the commoditisation of healthcare provision has pro-
gressed, rather than providing a lifeline for cash-
strapped health systems, as reportedly happened in other
West-African countries [52, 53].
That health workers come to own an undergov-
erned health system has been recognised also else-
where [54], although such crucial aspect is being
inadequately considered in the policy and planning
discourse. In Guinea-Bissau’s case, civil service jobs
represent one of the few opportunities in the country’s
tight formal labour market, which explains the willingness
of prospective candidates to pay hefty fees for low-quality
professional training. Health workers accept low and ir-
regular salaries because these are probably the closest
thing to a steady source of revenue. A public appointment
is made more attractive by the freedom they enjoy to em-
bark on an array of other profit-generating activities con-
nected with their position.
As witnessed in other distressed contexts, such as the
DR Congo [5], the health training system has grown
spontaneously, fuelled by its own earning imperatives
and market demand. As suggested for the DR Congo
case, technical measures are unlikely to address the
discussed shortcomings, nor will the health officialspresiding over (and benefitting from) them, be the commit-
ted enforcers of risky and controversial structural reforms
[13].
Counter-intuitively, Guinea-Bissau’s health workforce
looks oversized - particularly once locally-contracted staff
are considered—vis-à-vis its health service outputs and
meagre domestic resources, present and forecast. The
inevitable attraction of richer urban areas, rather than
the absolute lack of health professionals, is the likely
cause of HRH shortages in the poorer parts of the country.
And such earning perspective motivates young people to
acquire a healthcare qualification. The quality of the ser-
vices provided by Guinea-Bissau’s health professionals is
inadequately studied, but it is likely to be substandard. The
PNDRH provided an argument for the expansion, rather
than for the regulation of the workforce [55]; but expanding
a derelict health workforce without addressing its current
faults is likely to make them more severe and irremediable.
Can anything be done to stop the deterioration of the
health workforce in undergoverned countries like Guinea-
Bissau? The scarcity of reliable information is striking, and
the fluidity of the situation compounds matters, curtailing
the shelf life of the available data; the MoPH (and the state
administration at large) lacks the analytical, financing,
legal and managements levers needed to intervene suc-
cessfully in a field that has evolved spontaneously and
now responds to market signals more than to administra-
tive instructions. To offset such shortcomings, external
assistance should be strategic and sustained overtime,
which is seldom the case for fragile states [32].
What realistic steps should be taken to develop the
health workforce in Guinea-Bissau, or at least to contain
its deterioration? The recognition of the current picture
is sorely needed—by national and international policy-
makers alike; the image of a well-meaning, understaffed
and underfunded public health system struggling to bring
health services to the population needs debunking. Amid
Guinea-Bissau’s power vacuum and lack of employment
opportunities, health workers have come to own the
public health system and provide erratic, low-quality
and payment-only services to make a living. In Guinea-
Bissau’s case, this is the ‘elephant in the room’ of its
public provision of health care, and it is consistent to what
observed elsewhere in similar circumstances [56, 57]; any
assessment that does not confront such obvious although
uncomfortable fact would generate misconceived reform
attempts.
A rational approach to identify solutions in under-
governed states should start with the macroassessment
over time of the resource envelope, which would usher
in a discussion among stakeholders about what sort of
health system could be envisioned [58], and in turn
what kind of health workforce is needed. Present and
future funding levels are likely to be meagre, which
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public health service delivery structure. Investing available
public resources in stewardship and regulation, while
leaving service delivery to private providers, is concep-
tually appealing, but fraught with difficulties, as demon-
strated by state administrations much stronger than the
one under scrutiny.
Using carrots where no sticks are available. Subsidies
might motivate key actors to change behaviour; unen-
forceable regulatory provisions will not, and may make
matters worse. But effective incentives need an intimate
knowledge of the market and prompt reactions to chan-
ging conditions. External financial assistance, already the
source of the largest share of public resources, can in
principle steer the healthcare arena in desirable directions,
once the extent of privatisation and commoditisation is
recognised and provided its inputs are used coherently in a
long-term, firmly contextualised and strategic way. Aid
could be used to motivate training institutions to raise qual-
ity standards against a reduction of enrolment numbers.
Affordability and workloads rather than international
ratios (obviously beyond reach for a country as poor as
Guinea-Bissau) should indicate the number of health
workers to be trained. Hardship and productivity rewards
would offset the progressive numerical slimming of the
workforce. But better skills could not translate into better
practice if the interplay of incentives remains negative,
that is, if healthcare practice is conditioned by earning
pressures. In principle, fewer pairs of competent hands
could be paid better. Competitive salary levels could be
introduced after severing health workers from the civil
service. Turning healthcare structures into autonomous
bodies would facilitate such a process.
Meanwhile, the registration of active health workers
should be promoted, through tests awarding qualifications
perceived as advantageous in the labour market, for in-
stance by being preferred for recruitment by NGOs and
charities. The resulting information would then be used for
designing in-service and upgrading training programmes
aimed at raising professional standards. Any HRH develop-
ment plan should recognise the internationalisation of the
health labour market and in turn the limits of domestic
decision-making.
Conclusions
Guinea-Bissau offers a telling example of how a national
health workforce can deteriorate under protracted stress.
Analysing health systems in undergoverned states is par-
ticularly testing, given the informalisation of key aspects
of healthcare provision and the subsequent unreliability
of official data. The present study aimed at analysing the
HRH situation in Guinea-Bissau in light of the recent
literature on distressed health systems, with the objective
of contributing to identifying the forces at play, theresulting distortions and the counter-measures that
might be considered. Through document analysis, focus
group, semi-structured and in-depth interviews, we
aimed at assessing how HRH react to protracted under-
resourcing and mismanagement in the Guinea-Bissau
settings.
Since independence, political turbulence has impacted
on the evolution of the national health workforce, from
the waves of diaspora following armed conflict and coup
attempts, to subsequent mutually inconsistent rehabilita-
tion programmes sponsored by aid agencies and their inev-
itable repercussions on the health market (Fig. 2). Chronic
scarcity of funds and a ‘stable political instability’ emerged
as two key forces shaping human resources for health in
Guinea-Bissau for the last four decades. The commercial-
isation of public health services and flawed training and
deploying mechanisms naturally ensued.
Solutions will always be hard to come by in situations
similar to Guinea-Bissau’s; however, the hard-nosed
recognition of its ingrained, if embarrassing distortions,
coupled with an understanding of the incentives at play,
will be essential starting points. Analysing in some
detail the functioning of this de-regulated market will
offer indications to set up incentives enticing health
workers to perform better. Supervision and in-service
training will identify the most serious skill gaps to be
addressed in order to deliver better care. Stronger and
timely information will enable quick adjustments. Invest-
ments in local management capacity might be needed to off-
set the paralysis of central health authorities (and of the
central state administration), which might be beyond repair.Appendix 1
Interview questionnaire (in Portuguese)
Bom dia,
Somos uma equipa do Instituto de Higiene e Medicina
Tropical, e estamos a realizar um estudo sobre os RHS
na Guiné. O estudo visa entender as razões da crise
atual, com vista a identificar possíveis soluções.
Ice-breaker
Quais são as suas funções atualmente?
Qual é (ou foi) o seu contacto com a área dos recursos
humanos?
Qual é a sua opinião sobre a situação atual em que se
encontram os RHS no país?
Na sua opinião, quais serão os 3 constrangimentos
principais da força de trabalho da saúde neste momento?
Evolução histórica
1. Na sua opinião a situação era melhor ou pior antes?
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marcantes da evolução dos RHS ao longo das
últimas décadas?
i. Probe: Independência, Guerra, golpes de estado
específicos etc.
Distorções-chave
Composição da força de trabalho
3. Na sua opinião, quando um doente procura serviços
de saúde, para quem se dirigirá primeiro?
4. Quem são os prestadores de serviços de saúde fora
das estruturas públicas?
a. Probe: Quem presta serviços de saúde nas zonas
rurais e nos bairros?
5. Onde é que se poderão comprar medicamentos nas
cidades e nas zonas rurais?
6. Que tipo de pessoal é que se encontrará no sector
privado?
a. Probe: as qualificações e formação deles
7. E nos hospitais e centros de saúde público que tipo
de profissional se encontrará?
8. Qual é a sua opinião sobre a qualidade dos
profissionais que se encontram no público?
9. De que tipo de quadro é que se sente
particularmente falta?
10.Porquê é que as vezes há pessoal formado que não
se consegue colocar?
Comercialização dos serviços de saúde
11.Quanto é que o senhor/a acha que gasta em saúde
por ano?
12.Quanto custa uma consulta/operação no público?
a. Probe: as cobranças ilegais e os medicamentos
13.Sai mais barato procurar no privado?
14.Quanto tipos de sector privado conhece?
a. Probe: áreas urbanas e rurais
Fluxos de recursos e financiamento no sector saúde
15.Onde é que as pessoas encontram o dinheiro para
pagar os serviços de saúde?
a. Probe: remittances, emprestamos etc.
16.Os profissionais de saúde queixam-se que não
recebem salários ao fim do mês; quem deveria
paga-los?
17.E as ONGs e igrejas ajudam nisto? De que forma?
Pressões externas
18.Que doadores conhece específicos da área da saúde?
19.Conhece profissionais de saúde trabalhando para
ONGs ou igrejas?20.Que tipo de trabalho de saúde é que se faz nessas
organizações?
21.Acha que as condições oferecidas aos trabalhadores
são diferentes nessas organizações/igrejas?
22.No seu entender, porquê estas instituições atuam na
área da saúde?
Situação política e saúde
23.De que forma acha que a situação política atual está
a prejudicar os trabalhadores da saúde?
24.Os serviços estarão suspensos em algumas partes do
país por causa da segurança?
25.O que acontece na zonas onde não há segurança aos
serviços de saúde e aos trabalhadores?
26.Conhece algum plano de reforma da força de
trabalho da saúde?
a. Probe: PNDRHS, porquê não foi implementadoAppendix 2
Work history interview guide
1. Tell me a bit about yourself? How did you come to
work in the health field?
2. What kinds of jobs have you done in the past?
3. How did you get this job?
4. Where did you receive your training?
5. Where were you deployed after training? Probe: Did
you accept the destination, or tried to have it
changed?
6. How long have you been working here? Probe for
number of years or events that occurred when the
participant started working in the facility.
7. Given your position in this facility, please
describe(briefly) what your roles and
responsibilities are
8. Tell me about the different kinds of pay which you
receive (probe: salary; allowances; user fees;
payments from patients; incentives for deliveries;
private business etc.).
a. Which ones are most valuable for you?
b. Why?
c. How do they change the way you work?
9. Apart from this job, do you have any other jobs/
activities that you do/carry out as another source of
income? Tell me about them
10.How do you feel about your current job? What do
you like and dislike about it?
11.Are you planning to stay and work at this health
facility? If yes, probe for the reasons why. If no, probe
for the reason why the participant may chose to
move away from this work station.
12.What plans do you have for your future career?
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